Category Archives: Egypt

Qatar attempts to rehabilitate Sunni islam

It’s been a while that the Qatari have appointed themselves the “rehabilitators” of the misjudged Sunnis in the region. They have been offering a hand to all the Sunni extremists with the hope that they would moderate them and bring them into the mainstream of the consumption society. This is similar to the approach of Turkey in taming religious extremism. While it has apparently been successful in Turkey, any false move or a faltering economy may bring extremism back in the front.
The attempt of the Qataris is laudable in view of the harm that Saudi Arabia has done to the Sunnis by creating monsters like Al Qaeda and salafi fanatics in all the countries they put their hands on. Afghanistan and Pakistan are example of the Saudi Wahhabi negative influences.
Will the Qatari succeed? They have been helped tremendously by Al Jazeera spread in all Arab homes. Yet, Al Jazeera is increasingly criticized for dishonest reporting. In addition the Qataris have made several mistakes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria by supporting too obviously religious groups against minorities or secular groups. They are looked upon increasingly suspiciously by Arab seculars who suspect that they have another hidden agenda close to Saudi Arabia’s religious proselytism and to the USA’s dedication in protecting Israel. These agenda may appear disguised into calls for democratic practices that neither the Qataris nor the Saudis are practicing or intend to practice in the short term.

It’s an long term experimentation, heavily supported by the USA that want to see the end of Moslem terrorists that not only threatens them at home and in the region but also threatens their increasingly isolated ally in the region, Israel.
As long as the question of Israel is not solved, the efforts of the Qatari will be stained with suspicion. So it’s a complex game where it is not easy to win.
Bronco on Syriacomment.com

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13744&cp=6#comment-297788

 

There is no ‘Turkish model’ for Egypt

January 17, 2012 –
By Sebnem Gumuscu The Daily Star-

In Egypt, a number of younger and more moderate Islamists have pointed to Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a source of inspiration, citing legal reform, successful economic management, and electoral victories as models to be emulated.

In some policy quarters, Turkey has even been presented as an overall model for the Arab world – a characterization which derives largely from its seemingly unique ability to couple secular democracy with a predominantly Muslim society. But those who talk of “the Turkish model” misunderstand that country’s transformation. The coexistence between Islam and democracy has come to pass in Turkey not from the AKP’s development of institutional and political structures that accommodated both Islamic and democratic principles, but rather because Islamists themselves came to accept the secular-democratic framework of the Turkish state.

This transformation primarily resulted from Turkey’s neoliberal transition in the 1980s, which would eventually lead to the emergence of a new class within Islamist constituencies – one that would became the force of ideological moderation. Economic liberalization created an organized class of powerful and devout businessmen from the provincial bourgeoisie who advocated greater political pragmatism and stability in addition to closer relations with the European Union as a major trading partner. These moderate Islamists broke away and established the AKP in 2001.

As a conservative party representing neoliberal interests, the AKP has worked to downsize the state, establish greater political and economic stability, and construct friendly relations with the outside world. The party has not only increased its support in secular businesses and the middle classes, but also rendered the idea of a powerful state – which commands the economy as well as the lives of Muslims through Islamic principles – an obsolete one.

For the most part, the AKP has maintained the basic constitutional and institutional structure of the Turkish state, but has enacted constitutional amendments for EU harmonization and curtailed the power of the military. In other words, Islam and democracy have become compatible in Turkey under neoliberalism.

Observers who credit other factors with this transformation – such as Turkey’s culture of secularism, pressures from the military, or the country’s geographical proximity to the European Union – ignore the fact that Turkish Islamism hitherto successfully resisted these influences, established long before the Islamism’s heyday in Turkey. Organized political Islam in Turkey resisted the transforming impact of secular democratic practices as well as pressure from the military and the broader establishment while remaining staunchly anti-Western (anti-EU and anti-NATO) for close to three decades.

Conversely, Egypt’s neoliberalism mainly benefitted President Hosni Mubarak’s cronies and failed to trickle down to smaller enterprises. There is no strong business constituency within the Egyptian Islamist movement to insist on neoliberal reforms, a smaller state, or political pragmatism. The movement is dominated instead by professionals (doctors, engineers, teachers and lawyers) who prefer a strong and expansive state as a source of employment, social security and public goods.

While the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) established by the Muslim Brotherhood supports private enterprise, such support should not be mistaken for support for neoliberalism. A closer look at FJP’s platform reveals that it reserves a substantial role for the state in production, planning, price regulation, social security and job generation.

Demands for greater social justice for wage earners and calls for an elimination of unemployment among the educated occupy an important place in the platform. The economic system the FJP envisions is much closer to corporatism, oriented toward import substitution and export promotion than it is to a neoliberal economy with a small state and free trade.

Further economic reform is unlikely to generate the pragmatism that Turkish-model advocates envision for Egypt in the near future. Even if a new class of Islamists should flourish, as it did in Turkey, its ability to have an impact similar to the AKP will depend entirely on Islamist movements becoming full-fledged political parties.

Unlike its Turkish counterpart, the Muslim Brotherhood is first and foremost a religious society; economic, political and cultural objectives are secondary to religious proselytism. The FJP relies on the existing rank and file of the Brotherhood for support in elections, and though the members of the Brotherhood fulfill the function of party organizers, they are recruited primarily in the name of Daawa, or the invitation to Islam. From there, they are organized according to a strict hierarchy and mobilized in the name of Islam rather than in terms of political or economic interests.

This structure of the party reinforces religious priorities, undermines internal accountability, and casts a shadow of Muslim Brotherhood control over the FJP. The Brotherhood’s decision – accepted by the main body of the party itself – not to nominate a presidential candidate under the FJP is another demonstration of its subordination of the political to the religious. Unless the FJP evolves into an independent political organization accountable to its own constituency and oriented toward that constituency’s political interests, it can hardly become answerable to the Egyptian people.

In short, there is no “Turkish model” for an Islamist democracy; rather, there are Muslims in a secular-democratic state working within a neoliberal framework. Structural and institutional factors in Turkey are historically unique and it is highly unlikely that we will see a similar process unfold in Egypt. Under Islamist leadership, Egypt will seek another framework – one that will require the Islamist movement to separate its political and religious functions and allow for the political party to represent the aggregated interests of a voting demographic.

Because of this, the task of Islamists in Egypt will be more difficult than that of their Turkish counterparts. They must shed deeply ingrained habits of hierarchy and proselytism to build a democratic system with unique institutions.

Sebnem Gumuscu is a political scientist at Istanbul’s Sabanci University who specializes in Islamic political movements. This commentary first appeared at Sada, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Jan-17/160089-there-is-no-turkish-model-for-egypt.ashx#axzz1jiVTb6Qd

A year after Jasmine and Tahrir

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan- January 14, 2012-
It is still early to come to any conclusion about the dénouement of the churning in West Asia. Things are far from settled.

The euphoria generated by the Jasmine and Tahrir revolutions has all but dissipated during the past year. The unrealistic expectations, the hype built up mainly by the western governments and the media have given way to doubt, disappointment and even despair over the fate of ‘Arab Spring.’ The concern of most observers in the international community is now focussed on the direction in which “people’s movements” in various countries will proceed, and on the loss of lives that occurred in Libya, Yemen and, to a less extent, Egypt, and that is continuing in Syria and can be expected to happen in some other countries in the region in the coming months. It is a sad commentary on the rest of the international community that it unhesitatingly adopts the terminology coined by the West to describe the historic events in West Asia. ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ is a condescending description; it suggests that the people of West Asia have been sleeping all these decades, not caring for freedoms enjoyed by people elsewhere. The fact is that non-regional governments have been supporting the authoritarian regimes through massive supply of deadly weapons and technology, which were used to suppress the people.

Increased Shia-Sunni tensions

There are some who would like the Egyptians to believe that their revolution would not have happened but for the speech of President Barack Obama in their capital two years ago. The fact is that the people of Tunisia, followed by the people of Egypt, owe their revolutions to no one except themselves; they are the owners of their revolutions. If anything, the intervention of external powers, as in Libya, has complicated matters for the most part, created space for more extreme forms of Islamic thought to gain ascendance and, perhaps unwittingly, greatly accentuated the tensions between Shias and Sunnis. It is still early days to come to any conclusions about the dénouement of the churning in the region. Things are far from settled, except to some extent in Tunisia where it all began a year ago. Some broad trends, however, may be attempted.

Strengthening of Islamist groups

In all countries which have witnessed some degree of protests, Islamist groups have gained significant ground. In Tunisia, a ‘moderate’ Islamic party has won plurality of the vote. In Libya, where regional forces are refusing to give up their arms or disband their militias, hard-line Islamists, including loyalists of the al Qaeda, have secured influential positions. Egypt has surprised most observers, including knowledgeable Egyptians, by giving a huge electoral mandate to the Muslim Brotherhood and, more ominously, to Salafists; together, the two Islamist groups will control about 70 per cent seats in Parliament, to the great disappointment of the ‘secular’ forces. Similarly, in Yemen, the extremists have gained ground and will emerge as the most influential force as and when President Saleh leaves the country. The same phenomenon is evident in Syria in an acuter form. Bahrain is possibly an exception in the sense that the conflict there is between the minority Sunni ruling family and the majority Shia community.

The success of the Islamists by itself need not be seen as a negative outcome, except perhaps by Israel. Their success is an indication of the disillusionment of people with the ‘secular’ authoritarian regimes as well as the reward for the socially useful work they have been doing such as running hospitals and schools. Whatever the nature of the new governments, people will enjoy more freedoms and will have a greater say in running the affairs of the state. The most amazing phenomenon of 2011 is the shedding of fear by the people, first in the Arab world and, subsequently almost everywhere else, including Russia and China. (This does not apply much to India since we always were free and unafraid to protest and demonstrate, although Tahrir Square could have provided some inspiration.) The Time magazine is absolutely right in naming the unnamed ‘Protester’ as the person of the year. This means the Islamists, as and when they occupy positions of power, will not be able to manipulate people in any way they like. In the medium term, the Islamists-led regimes will insist, at the least, on all legislation being compliant with the Sharia, whatever it means in practice.

Security forces, the army and police, will continue to wield significant, even decisive, influence in the stability of governments. The Turkish model will not be followed consciously given past history but some variation of it should be expected to emerge at some stage. Libya has to go through the difficult process of creating an army out of disparate armed militias and will take longer to achieve stability. In Egypt, the armed forces, which have been used to wielding power for nearly five decades, will hold on to it for quite some time, especially since they also have significant vested interests in the economy.

More attention on Palestine

The Palestinian issue will receive much more attention and focus from the new regimes, which probably would mean more support for Hamas. Israel, which already feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear programme, will be under increased pressure to suspend settlement building. Israel’s posture will harden and its military spending will increase. The U.S. is in no position to bring effective pressure on Israel, especially in an election year, but it might appeal to Israel to be more reasonable on the Palestinian track in return for tightening the screws on Iran.

Syrian issue

Syria is a complex case but certain facts are clear. (1) There is genuine popular demand for reform. (2) There is repression and use of ruthless force by the regime — at the same time, it continues to enjoy the support of the security forces and significant sections. (3) There is open intervention by external powers and groups such as the Brotherhood as well as elements subscribing to the al-Qaeda ideology, if not the al-Qaeda itself. (4) Many dissident groups are well armed and have killed a number of security forces. (5) Western powers are determined to bring about regime change. (6) Israel is greatly interested in seeing Bashar Assad removed even if the alternative will be a fundamentalist regime. Its priority is Iran and whatever weakens Iran in the region is considered to be in Israel’s interest. Bashar’s removal will greatly diminish the Hezbollah’s ability to threaten Israel and also reduce Hamas’ clout. (7) Unless a solution is found soon, the country will be headed towards a bloody civil war.

The Shia-Sunni tensions and Saudi-Iranian rivalry will intensify. Iraq presents a most discouraging example in this respect. After so many years of American shepherding, society in Iraq remains deeply divided on sectarian fault lines. Prime Minister Maliki, now that he is liberated from whatever moderating influence American presence might have exercised on him, is dealing with the Sunni community in exactly the wrong way. The sectarian violence seems all set to return to the horrors of the 2005-07 period. Iraq’s Sunni neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, will definitely intervene to protect their Sunni brethren across the border. It is not a coincidence that Iraq’s Shia government has been voting against the Arab League’s decisions on the Alawite Shia-led Syrian regime. The Saudi hostility to Damascus has everything to do with the Shia-Sunni divide. Turkey’s current antagonism to Syria has many explanations and the Shia-Sunni factor is one of them. The Turkey-Syria-Iraq triangle offers quite a few fertile grounds for conflict — water, the Kurdish problem, Shia-Sunni hatred, etc. There is a tendency to downplay the Shia-Sunni tension but it is very much a fact of the Muslim life and it is better to recognise it.

In sum, the region is likely to remain unstable for quite some time. It would become destabilised should the Iranian nuclear issue lead to extremely harsh sanctions — and the process has begun — or worse, military action.

Some Indian experts would like India to take a more proactive role on the happenings in West Asia, to be on ‘the right side of the forces of history.’ It is no doubt good to feel self-righteous and earn an occasional pat on the back from the western or any other government. But it is more important to think of our national interests. Compared to our friends in the West, we are more dependent on the energy resources of West Asia. Most importantly, unlike other countries, we have to worry about 6 million of our compatriots who are working there and sending billions of dollars to their families back home. It makes sense to take a cautious stance, make as thorough an analysis as possible of the evolving situation and try to be on the winning side. That is our challenge. That challenge is coming sooner that we would like, in Iran.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2799237.ece

Year Later, U.S. Can Nurture Arab Spring’s Economic Roots: View

-By the Editors Jan 13, 2012-
Saturday marks one year since uprisings in the Arab world for the first time extirpated an autocrat: Tunisia’s Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

Tunisians will mark the anniversary by commemorating Mohamed Bouazizi, the young fruit vendor who sparked the Arab Spring when he set himself afire in front of a government office after police confiscated his cart. Today, it’s worth remembering that as much as the region’s rebellions are about the yearning for political freedom, they are also about the desire to make a decent living, unfettered by tyrants large or small.

In responding to the Arab Spring, the Obama administration appropriately promised considerable economic support to the region — especially to Egypt, the largest and most influential country attempting a transition to democracy. For a variety of reasons, this promise has yet to be fulfilled. With some of the obstacles now removed, it is important to accelerate action now.

Congressional gridlock over the U.S. budget delayed two important components of economic assistance. Only with the Dec. 23 passage of the federal omnibus spending bill did the administration get the approval it needed to follow through with planned Enterprise Funds for Egypt and Tunisia. Modeled after successful programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the funds will be capitalized using U.S. foreign assistance money — initially $60 million for Egypt and $20 million for Tunisia — and charged with making loans to and investments in the private sector. Now the onus is on the government to get the funds up and running.

A Debt Swap

The omnibus bill also provided the necessary authorization to make good President Barack Obama’s promise to relieve Egypt, whose economy is a shambles, of $1 billion in debt. The offer, however, is not forgiveness — a simple scratching of a line through an obligation — but rather a debt swap. Egypt doesn’t have to pay back the money. Instead, the U.S. will simply subtract $1 billion from the amount of aid it is scheduled to send to Egypt over the next three years.

What’s more, the offer is not without conditions. The U.S. expects Egypt to spend the $1 billion it would have spent servicing its debt on badly needed vocational training centers and an economic innovation center. The U.S. should stick to its guns to ensure this money is put to productive use, but it’s going to take some creative diplomacy. At the moment, negotiations over these projects have been delayed by tensions over Dec. 29 raids by Egyptian authorities on a dozen organizations, including three U.S. groups, working to support democracy.

In many ways, Egypt has proven hard to help. Its government has held up approval of plans for $1 billion in U.S. loans to finance infrastructure projects and job creation. In June, it also rejected a $3 billion International Monetary Fund loan, which the U.S. had encouraged. The country’s military rulers cited public concerns that the IMF’s requirements for economic reforms represented external meddling.

There will be another chance to get this one right. IMF officials plan to return to Cairo next week with a new offer, probably with tougher conditions, given the worsened shape of Egypt’s economy. The best advice U.S. diplomats could give the generals would be to take it, but only after laying the groundwork for public acceptance of the package by having the government propose it to the IMF rather than the other way around.

Unlocking the Aid

U.S. officials should also use their recently elevated discussions with the Muslim Brotherhood, which will dominate the newly elected Egyptian Parliament, to gently present the reasons the IMF deal is good for Egypt in the short and long term. Only the sealing of an IMF deal will unlock the large amounts of aid European and Persian Gulf countries have pledged but not yet delivered to Egypt.

The Obama administration’s plans for two major economic projects for the wider region are more or less on track. The president hopes to roll out a promised trade and investment partnership in Chicago in May at the next summit of the G8 summit, which the U.S. now chairs. Famously, the countries of the Arab world trade with one another and with the rest of the world at remarkably low levels.

The program — initially including the U.S., Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia — is meant to facilitate trade by standardizing such things as investment regulations, border transactions and tariffs. The sooner the system is functioning and shows benefits, the sooner other Arab countries can be added to it. It will also be valuable to include the E.U. in time.

One project is already reaping benefits. Since March, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the U.S. government’s development finance institution, has been working with Arab banks, guaranteeing up to 70 percent of the loans they make to small businesses in the region. In less than a year, the program has committed $650 million of its $2 billion.

For too long, tyranny in the Arab world has allowed the ordinary person no voice, no choice, and few ways to eke out a living. Those were privileges to be dispensed by the dictator. Creating the freedom and means for citizens to make a dignified living is not only the best way to combat authoritarianism, it is a worthy way to honor Mohammed Bouazizi.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-13/year-later-u-s-must-nurture-arab-spring-uprising-s-economic-roots-view.html

Turkey’s “common history and a common future” with Arab countries?

BURAK BEKDİL > Cigars of the Pharaoh (I)

I borrowed the title from an episode in “Tintin’s Adventures.” It’s up to the reader to decide whether Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan should play the role of Tintin and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu that of Captain Haddock, or vice versa. Or, in a more realistic world, whether any of the Turkish heroes should play any of the roles of the Noble Sheik and Rastapopoulos. To be on the safer side of “independent Turkish judiciary,” I should not comment.

No matter who is who in “Cigars of the Pharaoh,” the Pharaoh’s land today shines like a safe haven for the spurned lover that is Turkey. Once Turkey’s fake “hudna” with Syria and Iran (and probably with Lebanon and Jordan as well) ended up where it should have ended up, the broken-hearted Turks have rushed to the land of the Pharaoh to find solace in the brotherly arms of another Arab nation.
This may be the beginning of another hudna – another brief period of peace and alliance between centuries-long rivalry, bitter memories of Ottoman colonialism, future rivalry and the fact that the Turks are too little Arab, too little Muslim and too western of a Trojan Horse for Egypt’s future rulers. Some analysts style the potential love affair as the coupling of the most unlikely of couples while the optimists, as always, find the best virtue in literally everything the Justice and Development Party (AKP) does or hopes to do.

Judging by the dominant rhetoric only, there is good reason to be optimistic. In an October interview with the New York Times, President Abdullah Gül declared that the emerging strategic alliance between Turkey and Egypt “will be an axis of democracy of the two biggest nations in our region, from the north to the south, from the Black Sea down to the Nile Valley in Sudan.”

But it may be a bad omen that Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has spoken of “a common history and a common future that Turkey and Egypt share.” In his earlier speeches, Professor Davutoğlu had spoken of “a very long, common history Turkey and Iran shared,” (the same Iran which, ignoring Mr. Davutoğlu’s protest note, threatened to bomb the NATO radar on Turkish soil twice within weeks. Never mind if other mullahs “corrected” the threats; it’s sheer taqiyya.)

Mr. Davutoğlu had also asserted that “a common destiny, a common history and a common future” were the slogan of Turkey and Syria. It is nice that we Turks do not share “a common present day” with our Syrian brothers who kill and are killed by the dictator of Damascus, Ankara’s best friend until a few months earlier.

In other remarks, Mr. Davutoğlu had spoken of “a common history, a common destiny and a common future as well as cooperation between Turkey and Greece.” The cooperation between Turkey and Greece is perfectly visible in the Aegean skies where dogfights between fighter pilots from both shores with a common history and common destiny are a daily event. And the common future may mean sending more fighter aircraft and battleships to the shores of Cyprus to guard “common exploration for hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean.”

Mr. Davutoğlu had also spoken of a common history and a common future in Benghazi where, after Colonel Moammar Gadhafi, rival Libyans are now at each other’s throat in the name of democracy.
At times like this, the Turks have set out on a new adventure in Arabia in search of a new love affair with a common history, common destiny and common future: Destination Egypt! Will the great-grandchildren of the Pharaoh become a subservient nation to the neo-Ottomans after they were so to the Ottomans for centuries? Oh, what an exciting adventure…

(To be continued next Wednesday)
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/cigars-of-the-pharaoh-i-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=9317&NewsCatID=398

Egypt’s liberal and secular groups scrambling to balance out growing Islamist influence

AP, December 14 2011–

CAIRO — Overwhelmed by Islamists in parliamentary elections, the secular and liberal youths who were the driving force behind Egypt’s uprising are scrambling to ensure their voices are not lost as a new constitution and government take shape.

Two Islamist blocs — newly emboldened after decades of repression under Mubarak’s secular regime — won close to 70 percent of seats in the initial balloting on Nov. 28-29, while the revolutionary parties got less than 15 percent so far, according to an Associated Press tally compiled from official results. A power struggle is emerging between religious factions and the ruling military, with liberals appearing to be on the sidelines.

The second round of voting on Wednesday and Thursday and a final phase in January are not expected to alter the outcome, and Islamists may even boost their gains.

Without a doubt, the presence of the liberal youths behind the uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak will be meager in parliament and Islamists will be in control. But Wael Khalil, a member of one of the alliances born out of the uprising, Revolution Continues, said the fight for the future of Egypt will also be waged outside official institutions.

“In the media, in the revolutionary spaces and in the new media,” Khalil said. “This will play an important role in steering and influencing the discussions (away from the conflict and) toward the basic issues.”

The most immediate and urgent concern for the revolutionaries is the drafting of the country’s new constitution.

The new parliament will be in charge of picking the 100-member constituent assembly to draft the future constitution of the Arab world’s most populous country. Many fear an Islamist-dominated parliament may lead to a document guided by strict Islamic principles.

Egypt’s military rulers have clearly picked up on liberals’ fears. Soon after the Islamist surge in the first round, they floated a new idea designed to prevent an Islamist-dominated parliament from monopolizing the drafting of the constitution. A member of the military ruling council said the parliament is not “representative” enough of the country, and that a parallel military-appointed advisory council, along with the government, would work with the newly elected house to choose those who will draft the constitution.

Sameh Ashour, the head of the lawyer’s union and a supporter of the revolution, has become a member of the military-appointed council.

“We can’t leave the council alone to be pressured by only one trend in one direction,” he told the ONTV network Monday.

Khalil said the military is trying to play the liberals and the Islamists against each other to improve its own standing. He said liberal groups shouldn’t let their worries about the Islamists send them into the arms of the generals who helped lead Mubarak’s old regime.

“It is like running out from the frying pan into the fire,” he said.

Some suggested it was time to build alliances with the dominant parties in the parliament.

Prominent reformist columnist Ibrahim Eissa went as far as saying it is no point talking with the military, expressing a growing sentiment that the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly seizing the reins in determining the future shape of Egypt.

The badly lagging secular and liberal groups were scrambling to keep Islamist parties from grabbing even more of the spoils in Wednesday’s second round of parliamentary elections. They turned to celebrities and tried to adopt a more Muslim-friendly image.

Hours before voting started Wednesday dozens of volunteers crammed in a small room for a crash-course on election monitoring by one of the liberal parties.

One volunteer interrupted a detailed dicussion of legal procedures, saying: “We don’t have time. We want to save whatever we can.”

Omniya Fikry, a voter in Giza province, home to the famous pyramids on the western outskirts of Cairo, said she was worried a dominant Islamic bloc would reproduce the one-party system that dominated politics under Mubarak.

“I came out to give some balance,” Fikry said, adding that she was alarmed by Islamist candidates and clerics who have become increasingly vocal about wanting to impose strict Islamic rules on Egyptians.

“I was worried of all their statements about sex segregation, tourism and beaches,” she said. “Islamists can’t come after all of that and hold a stick and rule us with fire.”

While the Islamists ran a highly organized and disciplined campaign, a dozen different liberal and secular parties were unable to unite because of differences over strategies. The Muslim Brotherhood, known to many across the country for decades of providing social services the government failed to offer, had multiple advantages.

The Egyptian Bloc, a grouping of liberal and socialist parties, got just 9 percent of the seats in the first round of the elections. The Revolution Continues alliance, made up of socialist, liberal and moderate Islamist youth, garnered about 3 percent of the vote.

Some liberals claim Islamist parties improperly influenced some undecided voters outside the polls in the first round, and were monitoring Wednesday’s elections to avoid a repeat. But others say the secular parties have simply not worked hard enough to connect to the majority of Egyptian voters.

The country is largely conservative, and 40 percent of its 85 million people live in poverty. Many of the liberals clamoring for votes, meanwhile, come from relatively privileged backgrounds.

May Cholkamy, a candidate backed by the Egyptian Bloc, said she realized “how far (apart) the mentalities were” as she campaigned in poor districts.

Cholkamy, a diplomat’s daughter who has worked in public relations and banking, said she is now lobbying people from her affluent neighborhood to go meet the other side of Egypt.

“They just need to wake up … We can’t just live so far away from people,” she said.

While some played up the fear factor from Islamist groups or drummed up differences of Islamic interpretation among them, other liberals have tried to tweak their image in other ways. Some parties portrayed their candidates in a more Islamic light, showing some praying in campaign footage and pictures and promoting veiled women on their lists.

A TV campaign by the Egyptian Bloc drummed: “If you don’t want it to become like Afghanistan or turn into an America, chose the Egyptian Bloc.”

A new video campaign studded with young celebrities and actors was launched to support the Revolution Continues bloc; arguing for youth and trumpeting members credentials’ as leaders of the Tahrir Square protests.

Khaled Aboul Naga, a prominent actor, tells a hesitant voter in the video,

“I know there are trends and parties who want to teach Egyptians what is right and what is wrong and how to live life like them. I am not voting for those for sure,” he said. He said the Revolution Continues candidates “will secure that the voice of freedom is in the parliament.”

Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.