Category Archives: United Nations

Interview: Russian envoy to Lebanon on the Syrian crisis

Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: Alexander Zasypkin
Sunday 25 March 2012
By Tha’ir Abbas-

Beirut, Asharq Al-Awsat- Asharq al-Awsat recently met with the Russian Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, to discuss his country’s position with regards to the ongoing Syrian crisis. During the interview, Zasypkin outlined the principles of Russia’s stance focusing on a political solution in Syria, and what steps are now required in order to implement this. He also dismissed reports of Russian involvement on the ground in support of the al-Assad regime, stressing that his country wholly rejects foreign military interference.
The following is the text of the interview:
[Asharq Al-Awsat] What is Russia’s genuine position towards the current events in Syria?
[Zasypkin] The constants of the Russian stance toward the internal conflict are known, and they have not changed throughout the past incidents. These constants focus on the need for all parties to cease violence, organizing comprehensive national dialogue between the authority and the opposition, and reaching an agreement on all the reforming steps in Syria to attain a democratic regime in this country. We seek to achieve these objectives and need the assistance of the international community to start the political process in Syria.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Can we speak about an “internal crisis” when the opposition is complaining of “violence from one side”, carried out by the authorities through a strong and disciplined army? Is it possible to talk about two kinds of violence?
[Zasypkin] Of course there is the regular Syrian Army, which has the military superiority over the armed groups. At the same time, when we speak about halting violence, this relates to all parties because should the authorities alone stop the violence, then this would lead to armed groups seizing their positions, and this would not calm down the situation.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How can a peace process be reached in Syria in light of the opposition’s strong rejection of dialogue with a regime it considers to be criminal, and due to the brutality of this regime?
[Zasypkin] The opposition should agree to hold dialogue with the regime without preconditions. As for the role of the international community, we view the presidential statement issued by the Security Council yesterday as support for the UN envoy Kofi Annan’s mission, which aims to cease violence and start the political process in Syria. We hope that all the foreign parties will make efforts to influence the parties to the conflict in Syria to sit at the negotiations table.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you mean that foreign parties are having a negative influence on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] Throughout this period, we have been trying to change the situation from a confrontation to a political process. We wanted to benefit from the Arab League’s initiative and the observer mission, but the task of the mission was curtailed soon after it began its work. We consider this as having an adverse impact on the political settlement. The second thing is that we believe that the sanctions are not beneficial because they do not influence the policy of the regime, but they increase the burden on the people. And now when we seek anew to activate a political settlement through Annan’s mission, we hear talk about new sanctions and calls for international and Arab interference and measures such as the recalling of ambassadors. All these things are not beneficial. Anyway, since yesterday, we have taken a concerted stance at the Security Council and we want to rely on it to unify the efforts of the international community.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Russia has directed criticism towards the Syrian authorities. Why was that?
[Zasypkin] Since the beginning, we have been adhering to a balanced and open stance. When the popular protests and peaceful demonstrations took place, we pointed out that the regime’s reactions to these demonstrations were unacceptable. At the same time, we also highlighted the provocative actions of the armed elements, within the context of demonstrators, since April last year.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the policy the authorities are following in terms of confronting the demonstrations and the protests is appropriate?
[Zasypkin] We see mistakes, and at the same time we see the measures that have been taken over the past months, such as the issuance of laws and the holding of municipal elections and the referendum on the constitution, and now there are elections scheduled for the People’s Council, and we consider all these to be positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you think that the Syrian Government is moving on a positive track then?
[Zasypkin] Once again, I repeat that the reactions represented in the response to the demonstrations and the delayed reforms are unacceptable. At the same time, the reforms that have been implemented are positive steps.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] There is talk that Russia is risking its Arab relations as a result of its stance on the Syrian issue?
[Zasypkin] We are very concerned with preserving our traditionally good relations with all the Arab countries. At the same time, in light of the developments taking place at present, we adhere in the first place to the UN Charter and international legitimacy to a great extent, and we consider principles such as the sovereignty of the state and respecting the rights of people to self-determination to be more important than the temporary considerations in the relations with any state in the region. We think that this approach is better than playing for self-interests. The values related to the nature of international relations are more important than passing economic or military interests.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Russian Foreign Minister yesterday spoke about concerns of “Sunni rule” in Syria. What did he mean by this?
[Zasypkin] We want to keep away from sectarian conflicts, and during the developments taking place in the region, we seek to preserve the fraternal coexistence among all ethnicities and sects in the Middle East. We in Russia give a great attention to this issue because Russia is a country that has multi ethnicities and sects, and we hope that no problems emerge among the sects in Syria or in other countries.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The same as the Christians are the majority in Russia, the Sunnis are the majority in Syria. Is their rule of the country not something normal in any democratic process?
[Zasypkin]We are putting forward a set of principles, including one that says that democracy means respecting the rights of all the sects in this society, and this is the most important thing.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] To what extent Russia is involved in the Syrian issue? We hear talk about shipments of Russian weapons to the regime and military warships paying visits to Syria. To what degree are you ready to defend your stance on the ground?
[Zasypkin] All that has been said about Russian ships calling at Syrian ports to support the regime is untrue. The first ship visited Syria to receive supplies of food and fuel, and the other ship that has recently paid a visit did so for the same purpose. It is participating in an operation against the pirates in the Gulf of Aden along with NATO and European Union. As for Russian weapons, they have been possessed by the Syrian Armed Forces for decades. And as for defending our stance, we rely on political action and no other means.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] The Syrian opposition talks about direct Russian support for the regime in terms of training, drones, and other services?
[Zasypkin] All this is talk within the framework of a media war that is taking place at present. We deny such talk on a daily basis and consider it untrue, like the talk about Russian warships.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] How do you assess the Lebanese stance toward the Syrian crisis?
[Zasypkin] We are aware of the peculiarity of the Lebanese situation concerning what is going on in Syria. We share the Lebanese officials’ opinion that the Lebanese should as much as possible avoid the negative impacts of the Syrian conflict. We positively appreciate the measures that the Lebanese Government and the commanders of the Lebanese Army are adopting to safeguard Lebanon’s sovereignty and unity. We also believe that the political forces in Lebanon are adhering to the security and stability in the country, and this is positive.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Do you have information about the smuggling of weapons and fighters from Lebanon to Syria?
[Zasypkin] We have information from various sources that weapons are coming into Syria from the neighboring countries regardless of the stances that the authorities in these countries are adopting and without a decision by them. We know that among the measures adopted by the Lebanese leadership are moves to tighten the monitoring of weapons smuggling, and we are confident that this policy will continue.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] It has been said that Russia has learned from two previous lessons, in Iraq and Libya, and it does not want to lose Syria. Do you seek a price in return for abandoning al-Assad?
[Zasypkin] The main lesson from what happened in Iraq and Libya is that the world should have to witness the tragic results of the occupation of these two countries. Therefore, we do not accept the repetition of the NATO operations or any foreign military interference in Syria, and this is a principled position for Russia. As for the talk about the stance toward the Syrian regime, it has been and continues to be the same. The priority for us in Syria is to cease the fighting and ensure the democratic option for the Syrian people, including selecting a leadership through fair and transparent elections. We do not decide the stance toward the Syrian president and leadership because this is an internal Syrian affair, and it is not the right for any foreign party to try and impose its will on the Syrians.
[Asharq Al-Awsat] Who can ensure the integrity of the elections?
[Zasypkin] We are now seeking to arrange dialogue on the steps for reform, including the presidential elections, and this is one clause that the Syrian authorities can agree on with the opposition, so that the dialogue can then focus on the principles and the details. In light of the attention focused on Syria by the international community, it is possible to secure good international monitoring, and there would be no doubts about the results of these elections. I am explaining this subject on an assumption basis because we are now at the beginning of the political settlement. As for these steps, they are going to be followed by other steps later on.

http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=28994

New Phase in Syria Crisis: Dealmaking Toward An Exit

By: Sharmine Narwani [1] –

Published Wednesday, March 21, 2012 –

In recent weeks, there has been a notable shuffle in the positions of key external players in the Syrian crisis. Momentum has quite suddenly shifted from an all-out onslaught against the Assad government to a quiet investigation of exit strategies.

The clashes between government forces and opposition militias in Baba Amr were a clear tipping point for these players – much hinged on the outcome of that battle. Today, the retreat of armed groups from the Homs neighborhood means one thing: the strategy of militarizing the conflict from within is no longer a plausible option on which to hang this geopolitical battle. Especially not in an American or French election year, when anything less than regime change in Syria will look like abject failure.

And so the external players are shifting gears – the more outspoken ones, quietly seeking alternative options. There are two de facto groups that have formed. Group A is looking for a face-saving exit from the promised escalation in Syria. It consists of the United States, European Union and Turkey. Group B, on the other hand, is heavily invested in regime-change at any cost, and includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some elements of the French, US, British, and Libyan establishments.

Before Baba Amr, these two groups were unified in maximizing their every resource to force regime change in Syria. When the UN Security Council option was blocked by Russia and China, they coalesced around the General Assembly and ad-hoc “Friends of Syria” to build coalitions, tried unsuccessfully to bring a disparate opposition fighting force (Free Syrian Army) under central leadership, pushed to recognize the disunited Syrian National Council (SNC), and eked out weekly “events” like embassy closures and political condemnations to maintain a “perception momentum.”

But those efforts have largely come to a standstill after Baba Amr. A reliable source close to the Syrian regime said to me recently: “The regime eliminated the biggest and most difficult obstacle – Baba Amr. Elsewhere, it [eliminating armed militias] is easier and less costly at all levels. Now both political and military steps can continue.”

Dealmaking Begins in Earnest

The first clear-cut public sign of this new phase was the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN envoy to Syria. Annan is an American “concession” that will draw out this dealmaking phase between the Syrian government, opposition figures and foreign governments potentially until the May 2012 parliamentary elections.

This phase is what the Russians, Chinese, Iranians, and other BRIC countries have sought from the start: the creation of a protective bubble around Syria so that it has the time and space necessary to implement domestic reforms that will not harm its geopolitical priorities.

The European Union (EU) kicked things off in March in a joint foreign ministerial communique rejecting military intervention in Syria. This was swiftly followed by Kofi Annan’s strong warning against external efforts to arm the Syrian opposition, with various Americans making similar soundings in his wake.

One very prominent Syrian reformist who has remained engaged with both sides of this conflict, confided that the externally-based Syrian opposition are now “looking over each other’s shoulders – none yet dares to speak out.” The fact is, says the source, “they are getting military assistance, but nowhere near enough. They need much, much more that what they are getting, and now the countries backing this opposition are developing conflicting agendas.”

Three high-level defections from the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC) were announced within days of that conversation, hinting further at the fundamental policy shifts occurring in all circles, behind the scenes.

The game has changed along Syria’s borders too. Turkey, a ferocious critic of the Assad government this past year, is reconsidering its priorities. A participant in a recent closed meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reveals the emptiness of Turkish threats to form a “humanitarian corridor” or security zone on their Syrian border. Davutoglu, says my source, insisted in private that “Turkey will not do anything to harm Syria’s territorial integrity and unity because that will transfer the conflict into Turkish territory.”

Recent deliberations with Iran also seem to have resonated with the Turks. During Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi’s January visit to Ankara, a source tells me that an understanding was reached. The Iranian FM is said to have warned Turkish leaders that they were leveraging a lot of goodwill – painstakingly built up in the Muslim/Arab world – in return for “no clear benefit” in Syria. According to my source, the Turks were encouraged to strike a bargain to regain their regional standing – the key concession being that Assad would stay through the reform period.

A Hard Dose of Realpolitik

Although Turkey has backtracked from its belligerent public posture, there are still elements in the country that remain rigid on Syria. The same is true for the US and France. The fact that 2012 is an important election year in both countries plays a part in the strategy shuffle, but there are other pressing concerns too.

One major worry is that there aren’t a lot of arrows left in the quiver to fire at Syria. Without the UN Security Council granting legal authority to launch an offensive against Syria, there are only piecemeal efforts – and these have all been tried, if not yet exhausted: sanctions, demonstrations, arming militias, cyberwarfare, propaganda, diplomatic arm-twisting, and bribing defectors. But a whole year has passed with no major cracks in support from the regime’s key constituencies and that has caused some debate about whether this kind of tactical pressure may ultimately backfire.

In Washington in particular, alarm bells have been ringing since militant Islamists infiltrated the Syrian opposition militias, some pouring in from Iraq where they were only recently targeting American interests. The US has spent the better part of a decade focusing its national security apparatus on the threat from Al Qaeda and militant Islam. The execution of Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda-related figures was meant to put a seal on this problem – at least in the sense that the organization has shriveled in size and influence.

But Syria threatens to blast open a Pandora’s Box of newly-motivated “soldiers of God.” And while sectarian anger may be the fuse, the conflagration will take place on a major geopolitical fault line in the Mideast, at a delicate time, on one of Israel’s borders – and changing winds could fan those flames right back in the direction of the United States and its allies.

That is a red line for the US military and a sizeable chunk of the Washington political establishment. There are other Americans, however, who are unable to view the Syrian crisis outside the prism of Iran and its growing regional influence. US Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman, who has spent years now orchestrating the defeat of the Iran-led “Resistance Axis,” is one such player in the capital.

Feltman is part of Group B, alongside Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The battle in Syria has become an existential one for Group B. They have played too hard and revealed too much, to be able to re-assert themselves into any impartial regional role in the future – unless there is a changing of the guard in Syria.

As Group A moves toward a face-saving exit from the crisis, we are going to witness a re-telling of events in Syria. The Western “mainstream media” and major international NGOs, which have served as little more than propaganda tools for various governments seeking to escalate the Syrian crisis and vilify the Assad government, are suddenly “discovering” dangerous elements in the Syrian opposition. This scene-setting is just as deliberate as the false narratives we have witnessed from Group A since the start of the crisis.

Group B, on the other hand, remains unable to take its eye off the Syrian brass ring and may continue to employ increasingly brazen and foolhardy tactics to stimulate chaos inside the country. Syria may be Group B’s graveyard unless they are brought into these deals and promised some protection. I suspect, however, that they will instead be utilized as a valuable negotiating tool for Group A – brought into play if dealmaking is not working to their advantage.

While negotiations plod on over Syria, we can be assured that most external players have little or no consideration for actual Syrians. The regime will be focused on the long haul, which includes ridding the country of armed groups, ensuring that major roadways are free of IEDs and snipers, implementing a watered-down reform program with token opposition members to give lip service to progress, and becoming even more entrenched in the face of regional and foreign threats.

Meanwhile, the West and its regional allies will happily draw out a low-boil War of Attrition in Syria to keep the Syrian regime busy, weakened and defensive, while further seeking to cement their hold on the direction of the “Arab Spring.” They will pull levers to create flare-ups when distractions or punishments are warranted, with nary a care to the lives and livelihoods of the most disenfranchised Syrians whose blood is this conflict’s main currency.

It will never be certain if there was a revolution in Syria in 2011. The country became a geopolitical battleground less than a month after the first small protests broke out in various pockets inside Syria. And it is not over by a long stretch. Syria will continue to be the scene of conflict between two regional blocs until one side wins. This may be a new phase in Syria today where players are converging to “cut some losses,” but be assured that they are merely replenishing and repositioning their reserves for a broader regional fight.

Sharmine Narwani is a commentary writer and political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow Sharmine on twitter @snarwani [2].

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar’s editorial policy.

Sharmine Narwani
http://english.al-akhbar.com/print/5483

 

Text of UN Security Council statement on Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria agreed on Wednesday

2:17PM GMT 21 Mar 2012

“The Security Council recalls its Presidential Statement of 3 August 2011 and its Press Statement of 1 March 2012.

“The Security Council expresses its gravest concern at the deteriorating situation in Syria which has resulted in a serious human rights crisis and a deplorable humanitarian situation. The Security Council expresses its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria.

“The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

“The Security Council welcomes the appointment of Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, following the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States.

“The Security Council expresses its full support for the efforts of the Envoy to bring an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian access, and facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian oppositio

“To this aim, the Security Council fully supports the initial six-point proposal submitted to the Syrian authorities, as outlined by the Envoy to the Security Council on 16 March 2012, to:

1) commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;

2) commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilise the country.

To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centres, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres.

As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism.

Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;

3) ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level.

4) intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organising access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;

5) ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;

6) respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed.

“The Security Council calls upon the Syrian government and opposition to work in good faith with the Envoy towards a peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis and to implement fully and immediately his initial six-point proposal.

“The Security Council requests the Envoy to update the Council regularly and in a timely manner on the progress of his mission. In the light of these reports, the Security Council will consider further steps as appropriate.”

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9158161/Text-of-UN-Security-Council-statement-on-Syria.html

Assad’s Frustrated Foreign Enemies

Published on Al Akhbar English (http://english.al-akhbar.com)

By: Ibrahim al-Amin [1]

Published Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Various parties have been assessing the outlook for the crisis in Syria based on the evidence on the ground. The domestic scene is set to remain polarized for a long time. National understandings that can restore the country’s political unity and a cohesive national identity cannot be expected any time soon. The external scene has meanwhile become more complicated in light of the intensifying battle between the two camps over who will take hold of Syria, or who will wield the most influence in it.

On the domestic front, sources recently in Damascus say the political split is as sharp as ever. The pro-regime camp is holding together and its members have become more politically hard-line in their intolerance of all moves made by any opposition group. They deem the battle to be one against groups that have been armed – not just militarily but also in the political, propaganda, and economic senses – to target Syria, and not just its regime. They see President Bashar Assad as a symbol, and they want him to make no concessions at present. This loyalty has been accompanied by mobilization which has a minority, sectarian, and confessional dimension, though this is not fully reflected in the big cities.

On the other side, opposition groups loudly trumpet their rejection of any kind of dialogue with the regime. Indeed, they have moved on to refusing to deal with the regime’s institutions, conflating the state with the regime. They have thus started justifying attacks by gunmen on policemen and police stations or public institutions, or the bombing of vital infrastructure, as well as seeking to maximize pressure on the Syrian pound. They have also become increasingly virulent in their verbal attacks on people in the regime, and also on sects and denominations, betraying their need to keep tensions high.

A third group, which grows in size by the day, fears for Syria. This includes people who refuse to be asked where they stand. They are no longer prepared to get into a debate about who is right and who is wrong. Their concern is for the country’s unity and stability, and that priority overrides all others – even while they concur that this view ultimately works to the advantage of the regime at present.

Moreover, many Syrians who used to support the uprising for change have stepped back because of their abhorrence of the behavior of opposition groups – whether the armed groups inside Syria, or the offshore opposition groups that are trying to summon foreign military intervention in the country, without concern for the potentially catastrophic consequences of such a step.

Abroad, meanwhile, one year after the start of the crisis, plans are being reviewed. Miscalculations have been made, especially by those of the regime’s enemies who – with extreme optimism born of chronically deficient political judgement – expected that it would fall in a few weeks or months. Their disappointment and dismay shows, both on their faces and in statements. It is also apparent from the behavior of their diplomats, political allies, media, and security agencies.

This dismay is not only due to the inability of the internal opposition to bring about change within Syria. It is also because of their own failure to devise practical plans capable of achieving their goal of toppling the regime. They can now see in practice that the militarization of the civic protests in Syria created a major public credibility crisis for the opposition, and that going further as in Libya, or even Yemen, would only make people wearier.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime and its leaders have shown no sign of collapse. Despite several months of applying security, media, economic, diplomatic, and political pressure, it is clear to the regime’s enemies that it remains cohesive, as do its military and security forces. Nor have state institutions, for all their weakness, witnessed the kind of collapse that would obviate the regime’s need for them. Moreover, the regime’s enemies can see it has managed to restore control on the ground in many parts of the country, and has dealt powerful blows to its opponents – especially the armed groups which believed in the military overthrow of the regime.

Alongside these developments, the position of Russia and China, along with other regional and world powers, provided the regime with strong support against the foreign adversaries seeking to intervene to overthrow it. This is evident from the discussions currently taking place, and even the resort to the game of envoys and go-betweens, which nobody believes will arrive at any result in the foreseeable future.

All of this further narrows the options available to the Syrian regime’s enemies. But that won’t necessarily make them give up or back down. Rather, their increasingly hostile behavior suggests they are considering other means of achieving their objective.

Among the options said to be under discussion by these countries – and which other capitals have warned against – is action to persuade senior officers to mount a coup against the regime, or to make them feel personally under threat. It also seems that the insane among the Syrian regime’s enemies have started contemplating insane actions, namely, getting rid of Assad personally.

Do they think assassinating Assad will give them a chance to take hold of Syria?

Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

Ibrahim al-Amin
Source URL:http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-frustrated-foreign-enemies

Syria: Regime Reclaiming the Initiative

By: Elie Chalhoub -Published Thursday, March 15, 2012-

Insiders say the Syrian regime is confident it is getting a grip on the crisis, but expects no early end to unrest.

It took us more than one hour to pass through the Masnaa border crossing from Lebanon into Syria because of heavy traffic. “Spring” is returning to Syria, as a senior official puts it, while noting that he uses the term literally. “People are tired. There is a great yearning for normal life,” he adds.

Last Saturday, residents of Damascus were out and about in green spaces and on sidewalks.

Sources close to the regime insist that the situation “is better than before.” They add: “This is Damascus and this is Syria. We are not saying that things couldn’t be better. But it is not on the verge of collapse as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya claim. The situation is improving by the day. Even Saudi media admitted defeat: ‘Assad Wins the First Round!’” – a reference to the the title of a recent column in the Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat by its former editor Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed.

Diplomatically, Syria remains on the defensive, trying to fend off incessant attacks. The regime had tried to prevent the crisis from being internationalized and to keep it within an Arab framework, but to no avail. Its intention was clear from the way it dealt with various Arab initiatives, last of which was the Observer Mission led by Lieutenant General Mustafa al-Dabi. The Syrian authorities afforded him maximum cooperation, but his report ended up being ignored by the Arab states.

When they brought the Syrian crisis file to the UN Security Council, the Syrian regime decided to confront them in the same arena. Damascus seems comfortable with the framework of the international game and the limits drawn by Russia and China through their decisive vetoes: “no” to any military intervention in Syria, including under the guise of “humanitarian corridors.”

The conversation is a little different behind closed doors. Sources say that the proposal which Annan presented when he met President Bashar Assad was essentially the same as the Arab proposal which Syria rejected – minus the clause requiring Assad to step down. It speaks of a cease-fire, the release of detainees, dialogue under UN auspices in Geneva, and allowing international organizations to transfer relief supplies to Syria and investigate claims of war crimes.

According to the same account, Assad replied to the latter point: “Some disobeyed orders and some made mistakes. We arrested those about whom we received complaints, we carried out investigations and there will be trials. But I ask you Mr. Annan, are you willing to do the same with the other side?”

Assad also said he welcomed all mediation attempts and was willing to engage the opposition in dialogue and reach agreement with it. But he questioned how any agreement could be implemented in the presence of armed groups, asking Annan: “Could you guarantee that these groups would commit to what we agree on?”

Assad also urged Annan to investigate who was funding and arming these groups, remarking that someone must be behind the money and weapons flooding into the country.

According to the same account, Syria is taking its time in responding to Annan’s proposals as it wants to coordinate the details with Russia and is mistrustful of the UN and Annan.

Its suspicions were reinforced by reports that after leaving Damascus, Annan flew to Qatar to meet its Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasem Al Khalifa. Perhaps he considers Qatar part of the war on Syria and went there to engage it in dialogue.

Rewarding Aleppo

Discussions with Syrian officials indicate that after the parliamentary elections scheduled for next May 7, a new “crisis-management” government is expected to be formed. It is likely to be headed by a figure from Aleppo in acknowledgement of the loyalty shown by the city to the regime. Damascenes are also likely to feature prominently in the government, reflecting the regime’s gratitude for their role in protecting it, especially the business and merchant class.

Sources close to Assad revealed that he turned down a suggestion made by his advisers to form a new political party. He told them: “I am a Baathist and I will remain one.”

On the Offensive

While the defensive diplomatic battle continues, the military and security battle on the ground has seen the regime increasingly take the offensive.

Sources close to the regime confirm that the Syrian army has re-established control over the city of Idlib in the north, and is poised to attack Jabal al-Zawiya. Estimates indicate that the operation there might last many months. However the regime has set itself a target of trying to “win militarily in the main cities and towns before the end of this month,” as well as securing the country’s main highways between population centers, in light of assessments that reasserting full security control “is going to take a long time.”

One hears debates in Damascus about how the issue of armed groups should be dealt with. Some still contend that Assad has been too lenient, and demand that he crack down harder. They argue that if that had happened at Daraa when the unrest began there, the turmoil would not have spread to other provinces.

An informed source says Assad opted for a different approach: “The president was right. The military solution required the correct political circumstances in addition to preparing the Syrian army for this kind of fighting and training it in urban and street warfare.”

According to this source, these tactics were employed in the Homs neighborhood of Baba Amr, and “accomplished the mission with the least possible losses. The principle was adopted of controlling the neighborhood one house at a time. The army did not behave like a regular army that enters and establishes centers that turn into targets for gunmen. It used the style of commandos.”

The source indicates that Assad was convinced from the outset that the crisis would have to be dealt with “like a skin rash. In other words it cannot be remedied before it completely plays out. All one can do is reduce it and contain it to prevent it from spreading.”

Sources close to the regime say an effort is underway to restructure the 17 security agencies and place them – depending on the specialization of each – under the control of either the interior ministry, the army command, or the presidency. Combined, they will make up a new National Security Council. Assad wants this council to be truly accountable to the new parliament’s security and intelligence committees, which are to play a full role comparable to that of their counterparts in Western countries.

The sources say Assad is also keen to keep the security forces and the military out of civilian affairs and the media. All military and security personnel have been directed to stop dealing with the media and leave such matters to the relevant civilian officials.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.

 

 

 

Kofi Anan visit in Syria’s main objective: A secular Syria

By Bronco
8th March 2012

The fall of Bab Amr, the failure of the Friends of Syria have been signs to the US that it is time to play low key and change the original objectives. The US has been increasingly worried not only about al Qaeda but about Egypt who seems to be antagonizing the USA and whose Moslem Brotherhood seem to present a looming threat to Israel.
I think the US’s priority is now a secular Syria. They don’t want to take the chance that another direct neighbor of Israel become under the influence of MB or salafists. The US is realizing that Syria’s new Constitution actually denies religious parties. It is therefore a  much better guarantee than a “regime change” where religious leaders and movements may take the control (The fall of Iran shah is still in the mind of the US )
Even if Bashar al Assad leaves, the US does not want to see the MB or a religious Sunni majority ruling that they suspect will rapidly fall
under the control of radical Islamists.
The SNC has failed to offer enough guarantees that it will not be taken over by the Moslem Brotherhood. Therefore it has been reduced to just a small parameter of the equation.
I don’t think Anan’s visit has anything to do with Iran. Syria has
become a very weak link and is more of a liability to Iran than a asset.
The mission of Kofi Anan is to make sure that the reforms and especially the new constitution is applied after weapons are silenced, and that the fate of Bashar Al Assad be decided through early elections.
I think the message is clear : The regime must remain secular at all
cost even if it means keeping the old guard with the new constitution
that prevents a religious party taking over, thus guaranteeing the
protection of Israel and balancing the radicalization of the other Arab countries.

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