Category Archives: Religion

Is the Arab Spring Bad for Women?

Overthrowing male dominance could be harder than overthrowing a dictator.

BY ISOBEL COLEMAN | DECEMBER 20, 2011

In many ways, 2011 has been the Year of the Arab Woman. From the earliest days of upheaval that started in Tunisia last December, women have been on the front lines of protest, leading public demonstrations, blogging passionately, covering the unrest as journalists, launching social media campaigns, smuggling munitions, and caring for the wounded. This month, when Tawakkol Karman became the first Arab woman to accept the Nobel Peace Prize, she gave an enthusiastic shout-out to her many Arab sisters who have struggled “to win their rights in a society dominated by the supremacy of men.”

Across the region, though, Arab women are grumbling that overthrowing dictators is proving easier than overturning the pervasive supremacy of men. Gamila Ismail, a prominent Egyptian activist and politician, summed it up when she quit Egypt’s parliamentary race in disgust after learning that she would be put third on the list in her district — not a winning position. “We women had a very important role before, during, and after the revolution, and it does not work for us today, to accept this,” she complained in a television interview. (She ran and narrowly lost as an independent candidate.) In Tunisia, disgruntled women activists have formed the October 24 Front to defend women’s rights in the aftermath of the Islamists’ electoral victory there. “We want a constitution that respects women’s rights and doesn’t roll back the advances we’ve made,” said one Tunisian protester.

Arab women are embattled on multiple fronts. First and foremost are the deep-seated patriarchal customs that constrain women. Patriarchy is certainly not unique to Arab lands, but it runs deep. It doesn’t help that for decades, the women’s rights agenda was closely associated with the now-discredited authoritarian regimes: Egypt’s Suzanne Mubarak ran a state-affiliated women’s NGO; Leila Ben Ali, Tunisia’s much-hated hairdresser-cum-first lady, was president of the Arab Women Organization, an intergovernmental body sponsored by the Arab League; and both Syria’s Asma al-Assad and Jordan’s Queen Rania have been active on women’s issues. The rise of politically empowered Islamist parties that contest existing laws for women on religious grounds also pose serious complications for women. Although women’s activism has clearly been important to the Arab revolts, there is no guarantee that women’s rights activists will be able to turn their engagement into longer-term economic, social, and political gains. In fact, in some countries, there is reason for concern that women will see their rights erode.

Libya is a case in point. At the ceremony marking Libya’s official liberation in October, one of the first announcements from Mustafa Abdel Jalil, leader of Libya’s National Transitional Council, was that any laws that contradicted sharia would be annulled. He specifically mentioned that, going forward, polygamy would be legal, drawing cheers and celebratory gunfire from the mostly male crowd. Libyan women expressed surprise and disappointment and wondered why, with all of Libya’s pressing issues, reinstating polygamy should be on the front burner. (NATO leaders wondered the same.) Although polygamy was technically legal under Qaddafi, it was discouraged and today is not practiced widely in Libya, but that could change. Female university students, who largely describe themselves as pious, vow to fight this regression.

In Egypt, a number of developments over the past year underscore women’s rights as a flashpoint in society. The inspirational images of gender solidarity in Tahrir Square in the early days of the revolution quickly gave way to ugly episodes of targeted harassment. A hastily planned demonstration on March 8, International Women’s Day, attracted a few hundred women but was marred by angry men shoving the protesters and yelling at them to go home, saying their demands for rights are against Islam. Around the same time, the Egyptian military rounded up scores of women demonstrators and, in a show of raw intimidation, subjected many of them to “virginity tests.” On the political level, women have been excluded from major decision-making bodies since the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime, and it appears that few, if any, will win seats in the ongoing parliamentary elections. Their low success rate was not helped by the military’s decision to eliminate a Mubarak-era quota ensuring women 64 seats. This was a setback for women’s political participation, even though the quota enjoyed little credibility because it had been used to reward Mubarak loyalists.

The strong showing of Islamists parties in the first round of Egypt’s parliamentary elections has women’s groups worried. The ultraconservative Salafi groups, which took a surprising 20 percent of the vote, openly question a modern role for women in society. One Salafi leader refused to appear on a political talk show on television until the female host put on a headscarf. Another denounced the military government’s requirement to include women on electoral lists as “evil,” though Emad Abdel-Ghafour, head of al-Nour, the leading Salafi party, stated that the party does accept women candidates. Yet the Salafi women who did run demurred from showing their pictures on campaign materials, instead replacing their faces with pictures of flowers; moreover, the party deliberately clustered them at the bottom of its lists, making them unlikely to win seats. One Salafi sheikh recently issued an opinion that women should not wear high-heeled shoes in public. Along with Salafi statements of intent to ban alcohol and limit beach tourism, these swipes at women unnerve liberals.

Yet liberals have not been stalwarts of women’s rights in Egypt either. The 2000 decision to grant women the right to no-fault divorce (prior to this, they had to jump over the onerous legal hurdle of proving abuse or abandonment) was denounced not only by Islamist groups but by secular ones too — for undermining the family. Other changes to the personal-status laws in the past decade that have benefited women, particularly an expansion of custody rights, are coming under increasing attack. Critics discredit the reforms by derisively calling them “Suzanne’s Laws,” after Suzanne Mubarak. They claim the laws were intended to accommodate the wealthy friends of the former first lady, and they blame those statutes for a rise in the country’s divorce rate. Given the criticism of these laws from all sides of the political spectrum, it is likely that they will be amended by the new parliament, and not to women’s benefit.

Women seem to be faring better in Tunisia. Liberals and secularists have been deeply wary of the rise of al-Nahda, the country’s leading Islamist party, warning that it could mean a reversal of women’s rights. Since the 1950s, Tunisian women have enjoyed the most expansive legal rights in the region, including relatively progressive marriage and divorce laws and access to birth control and abortion. Since returning to Tunisia in the beginning of this year, Rached Ghannouchi, al-Nahda’s leader, has strived to convince Tunisians that his party will not seek to change the country’s personal-status laws. Some, however, have accused al-Nahda of obfuscating its real intentions behind moderate rhetoric — a charge that did not prevent the party from surging to victory with 41 percent of the vote in October’s election. Thanks to electoral rules requiring favorable placement of women on party lists, women gained 23 percent of the seats in parliament, a higher share than in the U.S. Congress. Most of the women are from al-Nahda and will likely reflect their party’s traditional views on women, but their participation in such large numbers at least normalizes an active political role for women. Moreover, Ghannouchi and other al-Nahda leaders so far have been purposefully focused on efforts to jump-start the economy, produce jobs, and reassure foreign investors. Al-Nahda has forged a coalition with liberal parties, and to maintain that coalition, it will have to continue to focus on the economy and human rights rather than getting bogged down in divisive culture wars.

Ghannouchi seems to understand that while rolling back gains for women can score points among Islamic conservatives, ultimately al-Nahda will win or lose on economic grounds, and women are important economic actors. With high rates of literacy and relatively low fertility, women constitute nearly a third of Tunisia’s workforce. Economic reality simply demands a pragmatic approach toward women. Let’s hope that Ghannouchi can get that message through to his Islamist brothers across the region. Otherwise, Arab women might soon be channeling their Iranian sisters, who have complained that Iran’s Islamic

Kofi Anan visit in Syria’s main objective: A secular Syria

By Bronco
8th March 2012

The fall of Bab Amr, the failure of the Friends of Syria have been signs to the US that it is time to play low key and change the original objectives. The US has been increasingly worried not only about al Qaeda but about Egypt who seems to be antagonizing the USA and whose Moslem Brotherhood seem to present a looming threat to Israel.
I think the US’s priority is now a secular Syria. They don’t want to take the chance that another direct neighbor of Israel become under the influence of MB or salafists. The US is realizing that Syria’s new Constitution actually denies religious parties. It is therefore a  much better guarantee than a “regime change” where religious leaders and movements may take the control (The fall of Iran shah is still in the mind of the US )
Even if Bashar al Assad leaves, the US does not want to see the MB or a religious Sunni majority ruling that they suspect will rapidly fall
under the control of radical Islamists.
The SNC has failed to offer enough guarantees that it will not be taken over by the Moslem Brotherhood. Therefore it has been reduced to just a small parameter of the equation.
I don’t think Anan’s visit has anything to do with Iran. Syria has
become a very weak link and is more of a liability to Iran than a asset.
The mission of Kofi Anan is to make sure that the reforms and especially the new constitution is applied after weapons are silenced, and that the fate of Bashar Al Assad be decided through early elections.
I think the message is clear : The regime must remain secular at all
cost even if it means keeping the old guard with the new constitution
that prevents a religious party taking over, thus guaranteeing the
protection of Israel and balancing the radicalization of the other Arab countries.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13912&cp=all#comment-299983

Do Moslems know what the Gospels represent for the Christians?

I have noticed that very often Moslems confuse the Bible (The Old Testament), dated 4,000 years ago, with the Gospels (the New Testament), dated 2,000 years ago, when they refer to the beliefs of the Christians.
The Holy Koran dated 1,400 years ago,  actually mentions many episodes and important individuals of the Bible, such as Abraham, Isaac etc… It also mentions episodes and individuals contemporary to Jesus-Christ, such as Saint Mary, or the prophet John the Baptist, yet it never refer to the teachings of Jesus-Christ that are present in the Gospels written by the Apostles. The Koran also eludes the death and resurrection of Jesus-Christ, events fundamental to the Christian religion. This is probably why many Moslems do not know about the existence and the importance of the Four Gospels in the Christian beliefs.
The Four Gospels relating the life, the teachings and the death of Jesus-Christ are the essence of the Christian religion.

Therefore it is fundamental to understand that the core and the dynamic of the Christian religion is not the Bible (The Old Testament) but the Gospels. The Bible stories are the historical foundation of monotheism for Judaism, Christianity, Islam, the Sabian religion ( Ahl al Ketab) in the Middle East. The Gospels, the Koran, the Tora and other sacred books have greatly overhauled and complemented the Bible’s teachings.
If monotheists religions share a similar base, the Bible, they differ greatly in many areas. They do not oppose to each other, but among other differences, they have a different philosophy of the notion of sin and a different perception of the relation between a human being and God and human beings among each others.

As for the Bible predictions, they are complex and difficult to decipher therefore there has been several interpretations of their meaning.
There has also been several versions of the Bible, which makes the predictions even more esoteric.

This probably applies to the new version of the Bible just found in Turkey claiming that the arrival of the prophet Mohammad was announced too.

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13744&cp=7#comment-297852

Qatar attempts to rehabilitate Sunni islam

It’s been a while that the Qatari have appointed themselves the “rehabilitators” of the misjudged Sunnis in the region. They have been offering a hand to all the Sunni extremists with the hope that they would moderate them and bring them into the mainstream of the consumption society. This is similar to the approach of Turkey in taming religious extremism. While it has apparently been successful in Turkey, any false move or a faltering economy may bring extremism back in the front.
The attempt of the Qataris is laudable in view of the harm that Saudi Arabia has done to the Sunnis by creating monsters like Al Qaeda and salafi fanatics in all the countries they put their hands on. Afghanistan and Pakistan are example of the Saudi Wahhabi negative influences.
Will the Qatari succeed? They have been helped tremendously by Al Jazeera spread in all Arab homes. Yet, Al Jazeera is increasingly criticized for dishonest reporting. In addition the Qataris have made several mistakes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria by supporting too obviously religious groups against minorities or secular groups. They are looked upon increasingly suspiciously by Arab seculars who suspect that they have another hidden agenda close to Saudi Arabia’s religious proselytism and to the USA’s dedication in protecting Israel. These agenda may appear disguised into calls for democratic practices that neither the Qataris nor the Saudis are practicing or intend to practice in the short term.

It’s an long term experimentation, heavily supported by the USA that want to see the end of Moslem terrorists that not only threatens them at home and in the region but also threatens their increasingly isolated ally in the region, Israel.
As long as the question of Israel is not solved, the efforts of the Qatari will be stained with suspicion. So it’s a complex game where it is not easy to win.
Bronco on Syriacomment.com

http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=13744&cp=6#comment-297788

 

Bitter Tears for the loss of the Syrian Christian Community

Bitter tears for the loss of the Christians and the minorities

In the middle east where there is variety of religions and ethnicities,  I have observed  that the ruling majority is always suspicious of the minorities’ foreign allegeance and tend to radicalize and often ostracise them. We see that in Iran, in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt,  in Soudan etc..
This is why generally, minorities feel more reassured when the country ruler is also from a minority.
In Lebanon the Christians have managed to obtain some sort of guarantee to keep significant political rights through an unwritten agreement of power sharing. This seem unthinkable for most Moslem Syrians. The fact that the Arab Sunnis will ultimately take the power from a minority will be seen ass  a sign to non-Moslem or non-Arab ethnic minorities that they will become second class citizens with little power, no protection and no guarantees. They will be systematically discriminated.
In these conditions, either they’ll fight back to get their recognition included in the Constitution or through a political agreement like Lebanon or they’ll create an autonomous areas like Iraq Kurdistan or they will leave the country.

Sunnis alone then will be responsible to move Syria into ‘democracy’. As there are no example of Sunni Arab Moslem working democracy, it will be trial and errors and under the advices and financial influence of rich non-democratic countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the GCC and some western-educated expats

Soon the economy will be in shamble, therefore many young educated Christians who could claim to be discriminated, will be welcomed in the Western countries and there will be a real brain drain.
Because the Islamic extremists are also Sunnis, it will be very difficult for a Sunni government to control them and Syria will fall prey to countries that would want to use it for their own interests. Israel will have no incentive to give the Golan back ever.
The loss of the Christian community and the loss of confidence of of the Kurds, the Alawites, the Assyrians in their role in a society from now on dominated by the Sunnis will transform Syria into a monochrome country at the mercy of the rich Sunni Gulf countries and the western countries and therefore,  like Tunisia. will become weak and dependent.
A gloomy future that many Syrians are fighting for.

Bronco on Syriacomment.com

What’s Really Wrong with the Middle East?

by Patrick Seale Released: 23 Nov 2009

British journalist Brian Whitaker has written a provocative and disturbing book about the Middle East. His title is the one I have put at the head of this article. His book is not kind to the Arabs, since it exposes the profound contradictions and weaknesses in their society. But it should, nevertheless, be translated into Arabic as a matter of urgency and be required reading by Arab elites from the Atlantic to the Gulf.

His aim, he says, is to stimulate debate. If the Arab world is to catch up with the rest of the developed world, it would do well to ponder Whitaker’s conclusions and heed his recommendations.

Whitaker has travelled widely in Arab countries and was Middle East editor of the Guardian newspaper for seven years. He evidently knows the region intimately. His strength, in researching this book, is that he has not restricted himself, as most journalists do, to seeking the views of political leaders and government officials, but has instead moved outside the strictly political sphere to interview a great many thinkers, academics, students, opinion-formers, bloggers, and ordinary people in many countries across the region. He has looked beyond Arab regimes to society as a whole. That is the originality of his book.

So, in a word, what does he say is wrong with the Middle East? In chapter after chapter, he dissects the “stultifying atmosphere where change, innovation, creativity, critical thinking, questioning, problem-solving… are all discouraged.” And that is not the end of it. To this list he adds “systematic denial of rights that impinge on the lives of millions: discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality or family background; inequality of opportunity, impenetrable bureaucracies, arbitrary application of the law; and the lack of transparency in government.”

Whitaker’s first powerful chapter deals with the failure of education in the Arab world — which he says is central to the region’s problems. If change is to be meaningful, he declares, it must begin in people’s heads. He quotes the 2004 Arab Human Development Report in saying that teaching methods in the Arab world — especially rote learning — “do not permit free dialogue and active, exploratory learning and consequently do not open the doors to freedom of thought and criticism.” On the contrary, “the curricula taught in Arab countries seem to encourage submission, obedience, subordination and compliance.”

The result is a “knowledge deficit,” hampering the development of a well-educated, technically skilled workforce.

Whitaker’s recommendation is that “Arab countries need to reform their educational systems and prepare themselves for the future.” But, he adds pessimistically, “the high value placed on conformity in Arab societies is suffocating change.” His controversial conclusion is that “the Arab countries cannot develop knowledge-based societies without radical social and political change.”

Another of Whitaker’s targets is asabiyya — solidarity between members of a family, clan or tribe. Such solidarity can provide security and protection for individuals but the reverse of the coin is that (in the words of the Arab Human Development Report) it “implants submission, parasitic dependence and compliance…”

Whitaker argues that the obsession with kinship in the Arab world undermines the principles of meritocracy and equality of opportunity. Nepotism hampers economic development and places Arab countries at a disadvantage in relation to those parts of the world where such practices are less prevalent.

His conclusion is that “Arabs cannot emerge into a new era of freedom, citizenship and good governance while their society continues to be dominated by the obligations of kinship, whether at a family or tribal level…” This, he affirms, is the central challenge the Arabs face today.

Another of Whitaker’s provocative chapters deals with the relationship between citizens and their governments. The typical Arab regime, he declares, is both authoritarian and autocratic — authoritarian because it demands obedience and autocratic because power is highly centralised and concentrated around the head of state.

He acknowledges that there has been much talk of reform and modernisation in Arab countries to keep pace with the rapid world changes, but he remarks gloomily that “actual reform, as opposed to mere talk of it, has been far more limited… Much of what passes for reform is just window-dressing for the sake of international respectability.”

One of Whitaker’s most controversial chapters is entitled “The politics of God,” and deals with the tide of religious fervour that has swept across the Middle East during the last thirty or forty years. Religion, he argues, is one response to what has become known as the “Arab malaise.” For millions of believers, religion provides a comfort zone of certainty and hope in a world of doubt and despair.

He quotes his sources as suggesting that the lurch towards religion began with the Arabs overwhelming defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967. But further impetus to the trend was given by the success of the mujahideen in driving out Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and by the success of Hizbullah in driving Israel out of Lebanon in 2000 after 22 years of occupation. The idea took root that military success was achievable when inspired by religion.

Religion, Whitaker notes, provides a sense of identity, of belonging and of solidarity in the face of threats from outside. But he warns that treating religion as a badge of identity can lead to a heightened emphasis on its outward, physical aspects at the expense of spirituality and ethics.

Moreover, as the religious tide swept across the Middle East, more extreme versions of Islam gained in prominence, more rigid in their interpretations of scripture and less tolerant of alternative views. This has sometimes bred growing intolerance, and even acts of violence like the occasion when, in 1994, the 82-year old Egyptian man of letters, Naguib Mahfouz, was stabbed in the neck outside his house. He survived, but his right arm was partly paralysed.

Equal rights, Whitaker argues, cannot exist without freedom of religion. In the Arab countries, this is probably the biggest single obstacle to positive change. In his view, freedom of religion requires a state which is religiously neutral. Separation of religion and state is therefore essential, he believes, to any serious agenda for reform.

Whitaker’s book contains a lively discussion of corruption and illegal commissions in Arab society, as well as the phenomenon of wasta, that is to say the use of connections, influence or favouritism. There is also a long and well-informed section on the Arabic media, which is too rich to be summarised in a line or two.

Whitaker wants the Arabs to break free from a culture of dependence and helplessness and for westerners, in turn, to break free from their history of colonial rule and military intervention, so that both sides can set their relationship on a productive footing of inter-dependence.

This book will anger some and excite others. It is one of the most ambitious attempts in recent years by a western writer to analyse what is really wrong with the Middle East.

Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

Copyright © 2009 Patrick Seale – distributed by Agence Global

Syrian Kurd Leader: Revolution Won’t Succeed Without Minorities

By Michael Weiss-

Jan 20 2012, 7:15 AM ET-

What Syria’s largest minority means for the uprising, for the opposition leaders, and the country’s future
It’s hard to know just how many Kurds are in Syria. The last census was taken 50 years ago, though demographers today tend to predict that Kurds number between 3.5 million and 4.6 million, or about 15 to 20 percent of Syria’s total population. Anyone with a nodding acquaintance with the struggles and strategies of this nationless people will know that they have been a decisive force in the federalist system of postwar Iraq and an ever-present human rights challenge for Turkey’s hopes for European Union accession. If the revolution in Syria is to have any chance at success, the Syrian Kurds will mostly likely play a major role.

Dr. Abdulhakim Bashar is the Secretary-General of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria — the sister party to Massoud Barzani’s Iraqi counterpart — as well as the Chairman of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a newly formed umbrella organisation representing ten Syrian-Kurdish parties. Bashar was arrested in 2008 before a Kurdish protest slated to take place outside the Syrian parliament in Damascus. He lives in Syria but gave me an hour or so of his time on a weeklong visit to London, where I met him in my office. We talked about minority rights in Syria, Turkey’s role in the Syrian opposition, and the prospect of Western intervention to hasten the end of the Assad regime.

What’s your relationship like with the Syrian National Council [the aspiring government-in-exile]?

I’ve been in contact with [SNC Chairman Burhan] Ghalioun several times, there has been engagement. However, their proposal is still very vague, and doesn’t meet our full demands for participation. For example, the SNC says it endorses lifting the “pressure” on the Kurdish people. What does that mean? We said in the KNC that we advocate lifting all the discriminatory policies that have been applied to the Kurdish people such as the Arabization policies in Syria, the Arabized name changes of existing towns and villages and demographic changes. These were all deliberate policies applied by the Ba’ath Party.

The SNC also offers a “democratic” solution without any clear meaning. What does “democratic” mean?  It might imply private schooling to learn the Kurdish language or opening satellite stations for the Kurds.

Such as Turkey has implemented.

Yes. However, we demand our cultural freedoms categorically.

“The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests”

Do you want to see Syria adopt the Iraq model, a federalist system based on power sharing, with broad autonomy granted to the predominantly Kurdish region? Kurds are more widely distributed throughout Syria than they are in Iraq, so that might be difficult to achieve.We demand the right to self-determination in a form that would be decided in a national Kurdish referendum, but also within the integrity and unity of the Syrian land. When Syria was formed, it was formed by the Sykes-Picot agreement, it wasn’t our choice. But we want to keep the current borders. With a new social contract between ourselves and all the Syrian components.

Second, if we talk about federalism in the Kurdish areas, from the northeastern part of Syria, up to the border with Iraq until Afrin, near where Aleppo is — the Kurds form about 75 percent of the population of that region. That land is the Kurdish land.

I’ve heard Yekiti and Azadi [Syrian Kurdish parties] have pulled out now or are threatening to do.

All Syrian Kurdish groups decided in Irbil in October to freeze any participation of Kurdish groups in the SNC. This applies to all Kurdish parties, from the Damascus Declaration on, and will continue until and unless the SNC listen to our demands. My party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, had an SNC member: we actually froze his membership before the conference in Syria that formed the KNC.

Of course, we cannot stop individual Kurds from participating in the SNC, although I suspect that as time goes on and nothing changes, they too will freeze their membership or quit altogether.

So what are the Kurdish National Council’s preconditions for joining the SNC fully?

 

We have four main demands, and they’re not necessarily all going to be fulfilled: First, political decentralization of the government. Syria is a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and multi-ethnic country. If it keeps to the same governing style as now — one central government — there is a possibility of civil war. Second, a secular state. Third, constitutional recognition of the Kurdish issue, a constitutional assurance that the Kurdish people are on their historic land. And the lifting of all discriminatory policies that have been deliberately applied to the Kurdish people. Fourth, the right of self-determination within Syria’s unity and integrity — that’s our condition to remain within Syria.

If the SNC fully recognizes the Kurdish Bill of Rights, we will join the SNC fully. Because we are very concerned that the SNC is so much influenced by Turkey now, they may postpone guaranteeing our rights until after the regime falls. Therefore we ask for a recognition of these rights in order to become a draft for a new constitution.So you want a written guarantee from the SNC?

We want a guarantee written and published internationally. The important thing to realize is that if we get our full rights, Turkey will be obliged to grant full rights to Turkey’s Kurdish population. If the Kurds were to get recognition in the Syrian constitution, Turkey will give similar if not more rights to the Kurds in Turkey. Syria is the key player.

Change in Syria means change in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran. Iran will be isolated because Iran’s connection with Hezbollah would not be so much facilitated as before [by the Assad regime]. The new Syrian government would not be an ally of Iran.

Ghalioun said this in his interview with the Wall Street Journal two months ago, though he’s gone back and forth on partnering with Hezbollah recently.

Ghalioun wants to be diplomatic. In fact, I believe, the SNC would completely cut ties with Hezbollah.

Recently, university students [in Syria] have said that Lebanese are enrolled in Syrian universities who aren’t of university age. This is from student sources. Students have said that these are Hezbollah members.

The SNC has not been recognized by world governments, apart from Libya’s, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. If it were, would you be more willing to join?

If the international community recognized the SNC at this stage, that would be a very quick decision. It still represents only one side of the Syrian opposition, it doesn’t include Kurds as Kurds. We are united and we have agreements. If we were to join the SNC fully, we’d do so from a unified political standpoint on this issue.

Is the KNC all in for regime change or are you entertaining a possible reconciliation with the Assad regime?

We are part of this revolution, we are not neutral. One of the main points in the KNC statement is that we don’t want the present dictatorship and we refuse to accept any future dictatorships. We don’t accept an Islamic government or a Muslim Brotherhood-led government. We will refuse that very firmly.

We have also decided not to have any dialog with the regime separately from the Syrian opposition. For example, if the international community decided all the opposition groups had to have a dialog with the regime, we’d support that, in case the current regime asks for negotiations for a transition of power, just like in Yemen. But that’s unlikely.

When I’ve asked SNC members about the poor representation of Kurds as a bloc in the Council, they usually reply by saying something like, “Well, we don’t want to give the Kurds their own bloc as we see the SNC as a non-sectarian political entity. Kurds are fairly represented in strictly political groupings that reserved seats in the Council, such as the Damascus Declaration bloc and the Local Coordination Committees bloc.” Is that just an excuse for exclusion, in your opinion?

Yes. It’s not just about Kurds, however. Arabs, Druze, Ismailis, Alawites, Christians have been ignored by the SNC, which is responsible for these minorities failure to participate as united communities in the revolution. Also, if the SNC says that Local Coordination Committees are very active in the SNC, I’d like to add that the Committees have very little participation of Alawites and Druze; only the elites of these communities are involved in them.

In my opinion, Syrian Alawites would not accept working in a central government with Sunnis because the regime has succeeded in sowing fear amongst [Alawites].

This is why we ask for political de-centralization in Syria. The regime has succeeded in convincing minorities that any change would mean a new Islamic system coming to power and the rights of these minorities would be lost completely. In order for the SNC to convince minorities to take part in the revolution and hasten the fall of the regime, it must send a clear message to these minorities to participate. Transitioning to democracy in such a country is very difficult; it can’t happen in one day. You have to give guarantees and assurances to each minority as these fit their rights and benefits.

You seem to be arguing that the Syrian opposition is doing the regime’s propaganda work for it, by not convincing minorities of the multicultural nature of this revolution.

Yes, exactly. Let me give you an example. In Qamishli [a predominantly Kurdish city in Syria], Assyrians have formed a pro-democracy organization, however they can’t gather even ten people to demonstrate in the Kurdish region. Why? Because the Church is playing a major role in turning Syrian Christians into shabbiha [pro-regime death squad] thugs for the sake for regime preservation.

The French ambassador to Syria has told me personally that he see loads of Christians every day telling him that their lives would be at risk if this regime changed. This is evidence that the SNC is still not able to be clear with other minorities to show their rights will be guaranteed.

The SNC is mainly focusing on things on the ground — the number of people killed, how to topple the regime — but not a political program to address the issue of minorities.

By taking what concrete steps, apart from guaranteeing Kurdish rights as you already discussed?

The SNC should, in my opinion, keep in contact with all the minorities and be positive about their demands within the unity and integrity of Syria. For Christians, the [SNC should emphasize] freedom of religion. It should reassure Alawites, Ismailis and Druze that they are equal in belonging to Islam, they are not outsiders to the faith. There must be a very clear program for each and every ethnic group.

The current path is the one that Islamists are taking in the SNC, not the liberal representatives.

Are there enough liberal representatives in the SNC to alter its approach to the minorities question?

The liberals are not enough to influence the SNC. That’s also our responsibility as Kurds. It’s the international community’s responsibility to pressure the SNC, and the Muslim Brotherhood, to guarantee the rights of minorities. And also — most important — for the international community to pressure Turkey not to take one side of the opposition over all others.

The Kurds are Syria’s largest minority, larger even than the Alawites. Would it be fair to say that there is no Syrian revolution without their full and wholehearted participation?

We are more organized and recognized as a society within Syria and other Arab countries than other minorities. If we do participate more actively, other minorities will feel more assured and follow suit. The regime has tried to convince the world that the conflict is between them and the Arab Sunnis. We want to prove that wrong. The revolution is not sectarian but it is being threatened by sectarian interests.

This article available online at:

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/01/syrian-kurd-leader-revolution-wont-succeed-without-minorities/251660/

For the Muslim world, it’s not a safe and easy path to modernity

By DOUG SAUNDERS-
From Saturday’s Globe and Mail January 21, 2012-

Countries like Tunisia and Egypt are changing the same way France did, with wild swings of revolution and reaction

A year ago, as he watched the great uprisings in Tunis and Cairo, French scholar Olivier Roy declared that they marked the end of Islamist politics. “If you look at the people who launched these revolts,” he wrote, “it is clear that they represent a post-Islamist generation. … The new revolutionaries are perhaps practising or even devout Muslims, but they separate their religious faith from their political agenda. In that sense, it is a ‘secular’ movement that separates religion from politics.”

Well, you might say, how awkward. Those January protesters may have been secular and liberal, but, when I visited Tahrir Square six months later, Islamists commanded the stage. We’ve recently watched Egypt’s first somewhat free elections give 48 per cent of the vote to a party controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, plus 20 per cent to 28 per cent to Salafists, who aren’t just Islamist but want an actual theocracy. Secular liberals were left with a rump of 15 per cent to 20 per cent. If this is “post-Islamist,” it sure has a lot of crescents and guys with beards.

This week, Dr. Roy – probably the world’s most respected scholar on Islamic societies and politics – was asked to explain himself on French radio. Did the Islamist electoral victories in Tunisia and Egypt pour cold water on his “post-Islamist” prognostication? Quite the contrary, he said. They proved it. The new individualism behind the Arab revolutions, he said, has led Arabs to vote for parties with an Islamic identity (in large part, because “secularism” was strongly associated with the dictatorships they overthrew) – but, in the process, it’s forced those parties to abandon the Islamist goal of a pure religious society governed only by the Koran.

“Islamist movements like Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt can no longer even be called Islamist,” he said. “They are conservatives analogous to the religious right in the United States.” Much as socialist parties in the West had to abandon the revolutionary goals of Marxism to become electable, the new Islamist parties have had to give up actual Islamism: They can’t impose the Koran on people, but rather combine “a religious reference” with democratic bids to influence “family values.”

I don’t quite share Mr. Roy’s optimism. While an Iranian-style theocracy isn’t a possibility in Egypt, there are leaders in the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party whose views on women and Israel are alarming enough and whose ties to Egypt’s military overlords appear authoritarian enough that the result could look a lot like Islamism.

Where the “post-Islamism” scholars do have a point is in their reading of the trends that led people to vote for the Islamist parties. These, paradoxically enough, are driven by a shift to secularization of private life. Egypt and its neighbours are in the midst of the same demographic change that revolutionized the West two centuries ago: Fertility rates are falling to European levels, and institutions such as first-cousin marriages are becoming increasingly rare. Religion has become a badge of identity, not a way of life.

This shift has made Islamists desperate to seize influence, because social influence can now only be won through politics. And it has put them in a unique position to gain it. Former Ottoman states such as Egypt never bothered to replace the religious obligation to give alms with a secular obligation to pay taxes. So the imams and mullahs became not only the leading voice of dissent but also the leading source of welfare. That, more than the Koran, wins them votes.

“The fundamental contradiction of Islamism is that its leaders think of themselves as guardians of a tradition, whereas the popular wave behind them is the result of a modernizing mental revolution,” demographers Youssef Courbage and Emmanuel Todd write in their analysis of Muslim-country modernization, A Convergence of Civilizations. “Political victory is inevitably followed by cultural defeat.”

In between comes a tumultuous time. The Muslim world is becoming modern the same way France did, with wild swings of revolution and reaction. “Westerners would like to forget,” the two demographers conclude, “that their own demographic transitions were also strewn with many disturbances and a good deal of violence.” It’s not a safe and easy path, but it’s progress.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/doug-saunders/for-the-muslim-world-its-not-a-safe-and-easy-path-to-modernity/article2309955/

Shiite Proselytizing in Northeastern Syria Will Destabilize a Post-Assad Syria

September 15, 2011 –

Iran’s ties to Syria go beyond the geo-politics of the “Axis of Resistance.” This is evident in the remote, volatile, and oil-rich al-Jazirah region of northeastern Syria, where there has been a noticeable increase in Iranian investment in religious and cultural centers over the last decade. Information gathered from interviews with Arab shaykhs, tribal youth, Kurds and Assyrians from the region suggest that Iranian financed Shi’a proselytizing, including cash handouts for conversion, is having an impact on conversion rates in the region.  Arab shaykhs representing the six largest tribes in the region assert that the Assad government covertly supports a missionary effort that has affected both the Sunni (Arab and Kurd) and Christian (Assyrian) communities. [1]

The Jazirah region encompasses the areas including and surrounding the cities of Hasakah, Raqqah, Qamishli, Deir al-Zawr, Mayadin and Abu Kamal. This region includes the Euphrates River and its major tributary, the Khabour River. Al-Jazirah is considered to be the agricultural “breadbasket” of Syria. It is also the locus of Syria’s oil industry and a major transit point for the entry, whether legal or illegal, of goods and livestock. [2] Arab tribal society is strongest in this region of Syria, which is comprised of tribal and mixed ethnic communities. Approximately 60% of Syria’s Arab tribal population resides in this complex ethno-linguistic zone, which also includes significant numbers of “politically sensitive” (non-Arab) communities of Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians and Turkomans.

Lingering ethnic conflicts and Kurdish nationalism have resulted in an extremely heavy security presence in al-Jazirah.  The Syrian government has historically employed a divide-and-conquer approach that has negatively impacted civil society and social cohesion in the communities of this region. Scores of individuals from al-Jazirah interviewed by the authors assert that the Syrian government is trying to create a pervasive atmosphere of distrust, especially between the Kurds on the one hand, and Arabs and Christians on the other. In addition to the intelligence and informant networks deployed by the regime in the northeast, other tactics to inhibit local level authority and autonomy are also utilized.  These include land nationalization, restrictions on farming and grazing rights and even forced relocation of whole groups of people (e.g. tribal Arabs and Kurds). The Syrian government’s attempts to assert total control over this oil-rich region have included blocking outside aid agencies from bringing relief to the area during the multi-year drought and subsequent famine that began in 2003.

The economic situation in al-Jazirah is dire.  The Hasakah Governorate in particular has been fiercely impacted by the economic crisis, precipitated by a multi-year drought that crippled the local agricultural economy and forced 36,000 families to leave the land they once farmed. Over 1.3 million people have been affected by the drought, and more than 803,000 Syrians have lost their work because of its impact on successive harvests (Executive [Beirut], November 2009). Even the more wealthy shaykhs of northeastern Syria are feeling the economic effects of the drought. Many of them are in debt to either the Ba’ath Party (through government-controlled banks) or to private lenders who cooperate with the Ba’ath Party. Shaykhs who refused to pay the exorbitant fees of the loan sharks were forced to leave thousands of acres of their land uncultivated for the 2009 planting season. [3]

While there are no generally accepted figures for conversion rates to Shi’ism in Syria, information provided to us by local shaykhs is informative. Shaykhs representing the six largest tribes in the region stated repeatedly that Shi’a missionaries were having an impact on Sunni to Shi’a conversion in the region, especially among the economically vulnerable young men forced to seek work outside of al-Jazirah. A Baggara shaykh reported that a Shi’a religious center near Aleppo, for example, sustains young tribesmen who leave al-Jazirah in search of jobs with financial support, information on safe housing and a place of refuge where they can interact with other youth from their home region. When questioned about the financing of the mosques, one local shaykh from the Jabbour tribe became uneasy, and would only state that the mosques were financed by “outsiders,” although he would not state who these outsiders were.

In a 2009 discussion with two tribal leaders, the Baggara shaykh (whose community is based both in al-Jazirah and south of Aleppo) stated that fully 25% of his tribe had converted to Shi’ism. While the second shaykh from the Shammar tribe (whose community is based in Hasakah) concurred with this figure regarding Baggara conversion, he stated that for his own tribe the conversion rate was less than one percent.  He added that the reason the Shammar are largely immune to religious conversion is their very strong adherence to what he termed “traditional Bedu values.”  He went on to explain that the Baggara were never historically “noble” camel herders and thus were “weak” in terms of adhering to traditional Arab tribal or “Bedu” norms.  In an interview that took place in June 2011, a local contact of one of the authors stated that the entire population of Qahtaania (a Baggara village between Qamishli and Malakiyya) has converted to Shi’ism, praying in the Ali ibn Abu Talib mosque built there in 2007. [4]

Conversion to Shi’ism is a contested phenomenon in the region. According to our interview data, the majority of converted Shi’a in al-Jazirah are secretive about their practices, preferring to practice their faith with fellow converts in husseiniya-like study groups in private homes. The main reason for this secrecy is the disapproval of the converts’ families and/or tribes. A contact of one of the authors, a young convert to Shi’ism from the Walde tribe that live near Raqqah, stated in September 2010 that: “There is a problem between the tribes and the Iranians, but between the leader [Bashar Al-Assad] and the Iranians, there is no problem.” Influential Sunni Syrians such as Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanouni of the Muslim Brotherhood have warned against “Shia-ization” in Syria. In a May 2008 interview, al-Bayanouni stated that: “on the cultural level, the Shi’ite school of Islam is spreading in Syria, funded by Iran and supported by the Iranian regime… This situation is exploited by people who give financial incentives, and pay the salaries of some tribal leaders, imams, and shaykhs, in order to convert these influential people to the Shi’ite school of Islam” (al-Arabiya, May 2, 2008).

The spread of Shi’ism in al-Jazirah, a majority Arab Sunni tribal region, adds another element of complexity to the dynamics of identity politics and organization of resistance to the regime there. Tribal, ethnic and sectarian differences exacerbated by decades of oppression and years of economic decay and out-migration, now coupled with Iranian cultural penetration through Shi’a missionary work, have destabilized the region and will have an impact on any attempt to form a post-Assad government in Syria.  It is the view of the authors that Iran has “soft” tools or resources in place that it can draw upon in a post- Assad Syria that reach beyond military and political power politics into the sociocultural realm.

Carole A. O’Leary is a Visiting Scholar at the Columbus School of Law’s Program in Law & Religion within the Catholic University of America (CUA).

Nicholas A. Heras is an M.A. Candidate in International Communication at the American University (DC) and a former David L. Boren Fellow.

Notes:

1. This article draws extensively from interviews conducted by the authors in 2008-2011 in Lebanon and Syria. The interview data suggests that there has been an increase in the number of Shi’a Muslim mosques and attendees at these mosques in al-Jazirah over the last decade.

2. See “On the Ground from Syria to Iraq,” Harmony Project. (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: July 22, 2008), p. 86.

3. Information drawn from author interviews. See endnote 1 above.

4. The village of Hatla, near Deir ez Zawr in Hasakah Province, is also described as having been completely converted from Sunni Islam to Shi’ism (Washington Post, October 6, 2006).


http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38401

A year after Jasmine and Tahrir

By Chinmaya R. Gharekhan- January 14, 2012-
It is still early to come to any conclusion about the dénouement of the churning in West Asia. Things are far from settled.

The euphoria generated by the Jasmine and Tahrir revolutions has all but dissipated during the past year. The unrealistic expectations, the hype built up mainly by the western governments and the media have given way to doubt, disappointment and even despair over the fate of ‘Arab Spring.’ The concern of most observers in the international community is now focussed on the direction in which “people’s movements” in various countries will proceed, and on the loss of lives that occurred in Libya, Yemen and, to a less extent, Egypt, and that is continuing in Syria and can be expected to happen in some other countries in the region in the coming months. It is a sad commentary on the rest of the international community that it unhesitatingly adopts the terminology coined by the West to describe the historic events in West Asia. ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Awakening’ is a condescending description; it suggests that the people of West Asia have been sleeping all these decades, not caring for freedoms enjoyed by people elsewhere. The fact is that non-regional governments have been supporting the authoritarian regimes through massive supply of deadly weapons and technology, which were used to suppress the people.

Increased Shia-Sunni tensions

There are some who would like the Egyptians to believe that their revolution would not have happened but for the speech of President Barack Obama in their capital two years ago. The fact is that the people of Tunisia, followed by the people of Egypt, owe their revolutions to no one except themselves; they are the owners of their revolutions. If anything, the intervention of external powers, as in Libya, has complicated matters for the most part, created space for more extreme forms of Islamic thought to gain ascendance and, perhaps unwittingly, greatly accentuated the tensions between Shias and Sunnis. It is still early days to come to any conclusions about the dénouement of the churning in the region. Things are far from settled, except to some extent in Tunisia where it all began a year ago. Some broad trends, however, may be attempted.

Strengthening of Islamist groups

In all countries which have witnessed some degree of protests, Islamist groups have gained significant ground. In Tunisia, a ‘moderate’ Islamic party has won plurality of the vote. In Libya, where regional forces are refusing to give up their arms or disband their militias, hard-line Islamists, including loyalists of the al Qaeda, have secured influential positions. Egypt has surprised most observers, including knowledgeable Egyptians, by giving a huge electoral mandate to the Muslim Brotherhood and, more ominously, to Salafists; together, the two Islamist groups will control about 70 per cent seats in Parliament, to the great disappointment of the ‘secular’ forces. Similarly, in Yemen, the extremists have gained ground and will emerge as the most influential force as and when President Saleh leaves the country. The same phenomenon is evident in Syria in an acuter form. Bahrain is possibly an exception in the sense that the conflict there is between the minority Sunni ruling family and the majority Shia community.

The success of the Islamists by itself need not be seen as a negative outcome, except perhaps by Israel. Their success is an indication of the disillusionment of people with the ‘secular’ authoritarian regimes as well as the reward for the socially useful work they have been doing such as running hospitals and schools. Whatever the nature of the new governments, people will enjoy more freedoms and will have a greater say in running the affairs of the state. The most amazing phenomenon of 2011 is the shedding of fear by the people, first in the Arab world and, subsequently almost everywhere else, including Russia and China. (This does not apply much to India since we always were free and unafraid to protest and demonstrate, although Tahrir Square could have provided some inspiration.) The Time magazine is absolutely right in naming the unnamed ‘Protester’ as the person of the year. This means the Islamists, as and when they occupy positions of power, will not be able to manipulate people in any way they like. In the medium term, the Islamists-led regimes will insist, at the least, on all legislation being compliant with the Sharia, whatever it means in practice.

Security forces, the army and police, will continue to wield significant, even decisive, influence in the stability of governments. The Turkish model will not be followed consciously given past history but some variation of it should be expected to emerge at some stage. Libya has to go through the difficult process of creating an army out of disparate armed militias and will take longer to achieve stability. In Egypt, the armed forces, which have been used to wielding power for nearly five decades, will hold on to it for quite some time, especially since they also have significant vested interests in the economy.

More attention on Palestine

The Palestinian issue will receive much more attention and focus from the new regimes, which probably would mean more support for Hamas. Israel, which already feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear programme, will be under increased pressure to suspend settlement building. Israel’s posture will harden and its military spending will increase. The U.S. is in no position to bring effective pressure on Israel, especially in an election year, but it might appeal to Israel to be more reasonable on the Palestinian track in return for tightening the screws on Iran.

Syrian issue

Syria is a complex case but certain facts are clear. (1) There is genuine popular demand for reform. (2) There is repression and use of ruthless force by the regime — at the same time, it continues to enjoy the support of the security forces and significant sections. (3) There is open intervention by external powers and groups such as the Brotherhood as well as elements subscribing to the al-Qaeda ideology, if not the al-Qaeda itself. (4) Many dissident groups are well armed and have killed a number of security forces. (5) Western powers are determined to bring about regime change. (6) Israel is greatly interested in seeing Bashar Assad removed even if the alternative will be a fundamentalist regime. Its priority is Iran and whatever weakens Iran in the region is considered to be in Israel’s interest. Bashar’s removal will greatly diminish the Hezbollah’s ability to threaten Israel and also reduce Hamas’ clout. (7) Unless a solution is found soon, the country will be headed towards a bloody civil war.

The Shia-Sunni tensions and Saudi-Iranian rivalry will intensify. Iraq presents a most discouraging example in this respect. After so many years of American shepherding, society in Iraq remains deeply divided on sectarian fault lines. Prime Minister Maliki, now that he is liberated from whatever moderating influence American presence might have exercised on him, is dealing with the Sunni community in exactly the wrong way. The sectarian violence seems all set to return to the horrors of the 2005-07 period. Iraq’s Sunni neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, will definitely intervene to protect their Sunni brethren across the border. It is not a coincidence that Iraq’s Shia government has been voting against the Arab League’s decisions on the Alawite Shia-led Syrian regime. The Saudi hostility to Damascus has everything to do with the Shia-Sunni divide. Turkey’s current antagonism to Syria has many explanations and the Shia-Sunni factor is one of them. The Turkey-Syria-Iraq triangle offers quite a few fertile grounds for conflict — water, the Kurdish problem, Shia-Sunni hatred, etc. There is a tendency to downplay the Shia-Sunni tension but it is very much a fact of the Muslim life and it is better to recognise it.

In sum, the region is likely to remain unstable for quite some time. It would become destabilised should the Iranian nuclear issue lead to extremely harsh sanctions — and the process has begun — or worse, military action.

Some Indian experts would like India to take a more proactive role on the happenings in West Asia, to be on ‘the right side of the forces of history.’ It is no doubt good to feel self-righteous and earn an occasional pat on the back from the western or any other government. But it is more important to think of our national interests. Compared to our friends in the West, we are more dependent on the energy resources of West Asia. Most importantly, unlike other countries, we have to worry about 6 million of our compatriots who are working there and sending billions of dollars to their families back home. It makes sense to take a cautious stance, make as thorough an analysis as possible of the evolving situation and try to be on the winning side. That is our challenge. That challenge is coming sooner that we would like, in Iran.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2799237.ece